program to develop a rapid deployment force; and that "After hesitating for two years to commit large men to such a force, the White House recently earmarked $300 million in the new defense budget for long-range cargo planes and ships for deploying the force; billions of dollars more may be needed in the next decade." By current estimates the force may reach 200,000. Kolb further notes that Smith's article did not discuss the means that were undertaken in the atmosphere he described, as I went on to do, quite properly and accurately. Comment seems unnecessary.

Kolb argues that my talk was "inaccurately false ... philosophically" because I argued against the sending of arms to General Zia's government on the grounds that while such arms would be worthless for defense against a hypothetical Russian invasion, they would be readily usable against the oppressor inside. Kolb argues further that such arms shipments would be likely to increase Western Pakistan's support for Russian intervention and indeed increase its likelihood, by the force may reach 200,000. Kolb further notes that Smith's article did not discuss the moves that were undertaken in the atmosphere he described, as I went on to do, quite properly and accurately. Comment seems unnecessary.

Kolb is surely entitled to disagree with this analysis of the factors that are likely to determine arms shipments to the region. It is his own decision, as the reader may see, to place all-of this in the context of the Cold War system as he sees it, with the superpowers as major actors. Kolb notes that a "realistic" arms shipment policy would be worthless for defense against a hypothetical Russian invasion, which allegedly threatens them, precisely because they know the history that is ignored by the "realistic" arms shipment policy that he advocates.

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The West will be in an appalling dilemma, revealed in Bula-Hisam, the Frontier and the Middle East. I went on to place all of this in the context of the Cold War system as it is actually functioning, namely, as a system in which each superpower exploits the threat of its powerful antagonist to justify harsh measures, sometimes even its own destruction, in what it takes to be its own security. I illustrated with a series of examples, arguing that the New Cold War is likely to develop in much the same manner; hence, the emphasis on the rapid deployment force, for example.

Kolb and the other columnists are surely entitled to disagree with this analysis of the factors that are likely to determine arms shipments to the region. It is his own decision, as the reader may see, to place all-of this in the context of the Cold War system as he sees it, with the superpowers as major actors. Kolb notes that a "realistic" arms shipment policy would be worthless for defense against a hypothetical Russian invasion, which allegedly threatens them, precisely because they know the history that is ignored by the "realistic" arms shipment policy that he advocates. Kolb is entitled to disagree with my religious beliefs about arms for what he called the "similar" case of Lebanon, for example.

In conclusion, Kolb is entitled to disagree with my thesis that there is a very serious need to place all of this in the context of the Cold War system as it is actually functioning, namely, as a system in which each superpower exploits the threat of its powerful antagonist to justify harsh measures, sometimes even its own destruction, in what it takes to be its own security. I illustrated with a series of examples, arguing that the New Cold War is likely to develop in much the same manner; hence, the emphasis on the rapid deployment force, for example. Once again, Kolb is entitled to disagree with the analysis I have presented, without in any way diminishing the importance of the issues I have raised. My analysis of arms policies and the risks they pose to the people of the region is intended to be a contribution to the ongoing debate about arms shipments and their consequences. Kolb and other columnists are entitled to disagree with this analysis, and I respect their right to do so. However, I believe it is important to continue the debate and to raise awareness about the serious consequences of arms shipments to the region.

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**But They Said They Wanted a Dormitory Exchange Program...**

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**Year two; course number zero**

(Continued from page 4)

Then again, so does putting a major declared after going un- designated. My problem is inter- esting. Although I pretty much figured what I was going to major in about this middle of last term, I have yet to actually designate. The letter I got just yesterday was more threatening than last year's; it was: "We have updated our Interuniversity Day of next term. If I don't suppose they'll either send a bit man out after me, or perhaps withhold my class cards (so what's new?)." When I finally choose, it will (probably) be a double major in mechanical engineering (Course 16) and public policy. I have about the third or fourth serious subject I have considered. After nuclear engineering I thought about the Interdisciplinary Science program, briefly con- sidered Chemical Engineering, and eventually settled on my pre- sent choice. This choice may, however, be only for this year. I am convinced that this in- decision is not solely a result of being female. I know quite a few guys who were undecided sophomores, and many others who eventually changed majors. It is about the more here not to major in what you thought you would when you applied to this place back in high school (undergrad high school, what you used to shoot more than four hours per day).

There is a reason for this trend, but I would not call it a problem. There are too many choices. I am planning to take 450 units, and there are lots of classes I would love to take which I will never have time for. Since choosing a major defines a good number of the classes you will take during the next three years, it essentially limits your choice with respect to all of the other classes offered here.

So, dear freshlings, make your decision as you will. If you are unsure in your choice, or even somewhat certain, I envy you and wish you much luck. In doubt, though, don't hesitate to declare "undesignated." You have nothing to lose, and an extra year of Open Houses to gain.