The Committee on Academic Performance has suggested possible calendar changes for second term of this year; both options they offer are inflexible.

If their first suggestion—which essentially moves back the entire second term three days—is adopted, the burden falls mainly on poorer students. Any student on a demand-scheduled flight at the end of January has already paid a $20 deposit for his or her reservation and stands to lose as much as $65 more if he or she has to pay full fare. The faculty who have arranged for jobs during IAP; they must now lose four working days to return to MIT in time for registration.

In addition, the end-of-IAP vacation is used by many students forinitiation, which would be disrupted if Registration Day is moved up and the vacation eliminated.

The second alternative, to turn four day weekends during second term into five day weekends, would remove an important source of release for students. The proposal constitutes a 25 percent cut in each of the weekends, and a definite drop in the number of vacation days during the term. It would also make it difficult for students who live outside the Boston area to get home during the weekend.

Both of the CAP's suggestions provide the same schedule for the end of the term; they suggest no intervening weekend between the last day of classes without finals and the first day of finals. Students could easily have term papers due on May 14, and finals the next day. That situation is grossly unfair.

The faculty are concerned, the concern should be expressed a year ago, when Commencement could have been moved. It's too late now to start changing around the second term.

We understand that the CAP has worked hard to devise these plans for whatever they feel is a very real problem. There is no doubt that all due precautions must be taken this year—followed by permanent measures in the future. But the suggestions seem to be too dubious to benefit a few, while denying a very real and high price to the student body.

WASHINGTON, Nov 16 - On the first anniversary of his stunning electoral victory, Richard Nixon has released a statement outlining his plans for coping with two rapidly expanding domestic crises—energy and Watergate.

Energy shortages, due to greatly increased oil prices, are likely to bring even more slowly increasing supply even at higher prices, have been forecast for some time, but the full extent of the impact is still to be felt later in this decade. Cyclical swings, which usually operate within the automobile gasoline trade, were initiated largely by Mr. Nixon's inept application of price controls. The evidence presented to him pursuant to authority granted by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1971 is that the price of heating oil was set at a level which made it more profitable for refiners to convert oil to gasoline than to heat oil; this led to a heating oil shortage in the 1972-73 heating season. When the price was increased, refinery runs were shifted from the production of heating oil to gasoline at a gain line shortage in the summer of 1973 followed by this winter's expected heating oil shortage. Embargoes on oil shipments to the US instituted by the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the wake of the latest Arab-Israeli War dramatically increased the cost of such oil. Their price.

Before delving into the numbers, it must be noted that, not only the production and production and consumption entail, but the price level of the requisite data collection effort outside of OPEC, the industrialized world power industries do not have a sufficiently detailed grasp of the precious price. Oil, in other words, has no value, and it is sold from oil well to final consumer, oil production is transported either by pipeline to Europe, partially refined, shipped to the Caribbean, further refined, shipped to the US refineries, and transported by pipeline.

It is estimated that the US, prior to the embargo, imported 10 percent of its oil from the Middle East, of which another 10 percent was imported indi-

directly through third countries. An additional 15 percent of oil consumed domestically is supplied by non-Arab nations such as Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. Thus, this country produces only 65 percent of its own oil consumption, and it is supplied. However, we are fortunate compared to the Japanese, who import approximately 90 percent of their oil, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Communist countries, who, on the average import 75 percent of their oil.

Unadulterated, overwhelming basic energy decisions was the frame that the "fuel crisis" was supposed to be a crisis for any American. But it will require some sacrifice by all Americans.

As the debate continues over the embargo, the impli-
cations of the emergency measures are: "If we have to cut the supply of energy, we must use less energy—that means less heat, less electricity, less gasoline. In the long run, it means that we must use less energy, without relying on any foreign nation."