The URBAN CALENDAR

At MIT:
A.J. Hagen-Smit, Professor of Biochemistry at California Institute of Technology, will speak on "The Chemistry and Physiology of Air Pollution" at a seminar sponsored by the Mechanical Engineering Department to be held April 11 at 3 pm in Room 3-270.

The Urban Systems Laboratory is sponsoring a series of Computer Systems Group Seminars to be held in the fifth floor conference room in Building 9 at 3 pm. The first is scheduled for Monday, April 14; Betty Schumacher and Tim Johnson will speak on "Applications of the ARDS Display on a Time-shared S/360."

Robert C. Wood, former secretary of Housing and Urban Development, will speak on "The Politics of Urban Development" at an East Campus seminar to be held Monday, April 14 at 8 pm in Talbot Lounge.

"Urban Life" will be the topic of the Thursday evening Karl Taylor Compton Seminar. Panel members include Hubert Humphrey, Provost Jerome Wiesner, Willard Johnson, Jerome Lettvin, John Collins and Leonard Fein. The seminar will be held April 17 at 8 pm in Kresge Auditorium.

At Harvard:
Peter Eisenman, Director of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, will speak at a lecture sponsored by the Joint Center for Urban Studies at 8 pm on April 15 at Harvard in Hunt A.

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Sponsored by the Urban Systems Laboratory

U.S. Army Photo

ABM: Ajax to safeguard with the M.I. complex

By Harvey Baker, Jacob Schacter, Kirk Nelson, Bob Anderson

(ed. note: This is the first of two articles exploring the history and issues of the current ABM debate.)

The fame over construction of a US anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) was acquired by Nixon's March 14 decision to proceed with ABM deployment at a cost of 6-7 billion dollars.

In the budget controversy it is worthwhile to give a history of the ABM in America. In addition, in the coming article, the wisdom of the President's plan will be questioned and other reasons besides those official reasons Mr. Nixon gave at his news conference will be proposed for why the President wants construction of this ABM system.

The ABM dates back to the 1955 concerns of the Nixon-Zeus aircraft missile. At that time the only working method of delivering a nuclear attack was via airplane. Ground-launched ICBM had not been developed. The Nike-Ajax soon gave way to the Nike-Hercules. The Hercules existed only as a working test model; the system never went into operation.

In 1955-1959, the US anti-missile defense was modified to meet the threat of the Soviet Union's ICBM. In 1959 the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the Nike-Zeus Anti-ABM system and was deployed for Presidential protection.

Despite considerable pro-Nike-Zeus pressure, the late President Eisenhower rejected the system as inadequately tested and unnecessary for national defense. Dr. Jerome E. Wiesner, provost of MIT and science advisor to the late President John Kennedy, suggests that the bitter warnings against the power of the military-industrial complex in Eisenhower's farewell speech were a result of the pro-Nike-Zeus pressure which the military-industrial complex existed on Eisenhower.

The specifications of the Nike-Zeus were either never made fully public and hence would be difficult to use. The Nike-Zeus employed much of the same qualities as its predecessors and was deployed around the cities to destroy incoming ICBM's. The aerodynamics of the Nike-Zeus tracked the incoming offensive missiles, calculated the trajectory and and sent the Nike-Zeus up to intercept it. The specifications were such that assuming 100% performance, it would take one Nike-Zeus to destroy one ICBM, i.e., the single point saturation of the system being overwhelmed at any one point was always present.

In addition the Nike-Zeus was not equipped with any sophisticated equipment to discriminate between military and nuclear devices. The Nike never hit the ICBM; rather when it got close to the offensive missile, its nuclear warhead was exploded, releasing a flux of neutrons which heated and melted the nuclear weapon on the ICBM.

If deployed, the Nike-Zeus would have cost the nation 14 billion dollars. The late President John Kennedy rejected the system as inadequate, inadequate, and unnecessary for national defense. He began to get pointed questions from the press about the plans to deploy the Nike-Zeus system.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against deployment. The- late President Kennedy, while not opposing deployment, was not ready to risk so much money. Through 1961, the Nike-Zeus system was set aside, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to get a flood of mail, from friends, from Congress, from people in the opposition. As a result the Army set to solve the single point saturation problem. The Army fathers Nike-X was devised as a dual system.

The specifications of Nike-X were made public with the idea that we deploy the "thin" Nike-Zeus to the Paris "peace talks" stated that if the system of the Nike-Zeus had been deployed, it would have had to be the Nike-Zeus would burn up before it became operational. Secretary of Defense McNamara admitted that it would have been a very bad mistake to have deployed the Nike-Zeus even if the opposition goes on and on...

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