Spencer and Clifford. To be sure, there are many passages in Spencer which look the other way: "I think, however," says Mr. Lilly, "that if we closely examine his writings, we shall find the persistence of force his one formula. With that he will bring for you life out of the non-living, morality out of the unethical, the spiritual out of the physical."

Against all this Mr. Lilly presents himself as the champion of the opposing doctrines, and he draws out the difference between the two systems very clearly in a single paragraph: "It will be found in the long run that there are two and only two great schools of thought; two schools which, in common with the philosophical writers of Germany, France, and Italy, I shall denominate Spiritualism ('in spite,' he says, 'of the abuse of that word by vulgar charlatans') and Materialism, until better terms are forthcoming. Spiritualism seeks the explanation of the universe from within, and, with Kant, holds it as a fundamental truth that the nature of our thinking being imposes one way of conceiving, of valuing, and even of apprehending, invisible things. Materialism maintains that in these sensible things must be sought the explanation of our ideas and our wills. Spiritualism postulates a First Cause possessing absolute freedom, and recognizes true causality in man also, with his endowment of limited and conditioned liberty of will. Materialism holds that we can know nothing before the proximate and determining causes of phenomena, and demands, in the words of Mr. Huxley, "the banishment from all regions of thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." Spiritualism insists upon the unity of consciousness—upon consciousness of personal identity—as the original and ultimate fact of man's existence. Materialism dissolves the ego into a collection of sensations, makes of consciousness an accidental and superficial effect of mechanism, and exhibits man a mere sequence of action and reaction. Spiritualism maintains the absolute nature of ethics, the immutable distinction between moral good and evil; Materialism refers everything to heredity, temperament, environment, convention.

He says that Mr. Herbert Spencer resolves moral obligation into "a long-sighted selfishness, its sanction into a brain-track;" while Mr. Taine calls virtue and vice "merely products, like sugar and vitriol." To this he opposes the following from Kant: "Will is a kind of causality, belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational; and freedom is such a property of causality as enables them to be efficient agents independently of outside causes determining them; while, on the other hand, necessity is that property of all irrational beings which consists in their being determined to activity by the influence of outside causes." This conception of human freedom, says Mr. Lilly, underlies the notion of crime. The sense of crime is bound up with the belief in man's power of choice, and in his obligation to choose rightly.

This brief abstract gives but little idea of the abundance of illustration which characterizes the paper. But Prof. Huxley found himself by no means satisfied with the writer's exposition of his opinions, and in a characteristically vivacious article in the next number he gives his reply. He even complains that Mr. Lilly attributes to him ideas which he has been all his life opposing; and he makes it abundantly evident that he is no adherent of that gross form of materialism represented by Büchner's "Kraft und Stoff," the doctrine "that there is nothing in the universe but matter and force, and that all the phenomena of nature are explicable by deduction from properties assignable to these two primitive factors." "It seems to me pretty plain," he says, "that there is a third thing in the universe, to wit, consciousness, which I cannot see to be matter or force, or any conceivable modification of either, however intimately the manifestations of the phenomena of consciousness may be connected with the phenomena known as matter or force." Elsewhere, he says that no one doubts that consciousness, in certain forms, at any rate, is a cerebral function, implying that human consciousness is not wholly dependent on the material brain so as to perish with it. But, in spite of this admission, he at once proceeds to declare himself, in regard to the opposite doctrine, an entire "agnostic," a know-nothing, and as purely a "determinist," that is to say, a fatalist, as the most out-and-out believer in nothing but matter and force. An acute writer in the London Spectator for December 4th, taking the other side very vigorously, winds up the controversy by pointing out Prof. Huxley's inconsistencies. He is much too clear a thinker to be satisfied with the gross materialism of such men as Büchner, but he fails to see that when he admits that he cannot prove that all forms of consciousness are functions of the brain, he knocks the whole foundation of materialism away.