Tewhey v. MIT
Complaint filed in Middlesex
Superior Court on April 11, 1995.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
MIDDLESEX, SS SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL DOCKET NO.
95-2130
JAMES R. TEWHEY
PLAINTIFF
v.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
CHARLES M . VEST, MARK S . WRIGHTON, MARY P. ROWE
JOAN F. RICE, ARTHUR C. SMITH, ANNE GLAVIN
SHARON P. SHEA, STAN HUDSON AND
KATHERINE M. NOLAN
DEFENDANT
COMPLAINT (JURY CLAIM)
COUNT I
(VIOLATION OF GENERAL LAWS CHAPTER 151B)
1. The plaintiff, James R. Tewhey ("Tewhey") is a resident of Sudbury,
Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
2. The defendant, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ("MIT") is an
educational institution located in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
3. The defendant, Charles M. Vest ("Vest") was at all material times
employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge,
Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
4. The defendant, Mark S. Wrighton ("Wrighton") was at all material
times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge,
Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
5. The defendant, Mary P. Rowe ("Rowe") was at all material times
employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge,
Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
6. The defendant, Joan F. Rice (price) was at all material times
employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge,
Middlesex county, Massachusetts.
7. The defendant, Arthur C. Smith ("Smith") was at all material times
employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge,
Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
8. The defendant, Sharon P. Shea ("Shea") was at all material times
employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge,
Middlesex county, Massachusetts.
9. The defendant, Katherine M. Nolan (UNolantt) was at all material
times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge,
Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
10. Tewhey began his employment with defendant MIT in August, 1986 as
Associate Dean of Students.
11. Tewhey always performed his work in a fully competent and
professional manner over the years.
12. On or about July 9, 1992, Tewhey ended a personal relationship
with Nolan. Nolan threatened Tewhey that if he refused to continue the
relationship with her, she would insure that he would end up without
friends, family, and job.
13. On or about July 17, l992, Nolan called two neighbors of Tewhey to
inform them of the former relationship and described Tewhey as
unstable.
14. On or about July 21, 1992, Nolan went to Tewhey's supervisor
(Smith), described Tewhey as mentally ill and asked that he be removed
from his position at MIT.
15. On or about July 31, 1995, Nolan called and harassed Tewhey's wife
at her place of employment and attempted to convince Tewhey's wife
that she should leave him.
16. Sometime on or about August 3, 1994, Nolan called Tewhey's mother,
harassing her and demanding that Tewhey's mother supply Nolan with the
names and addresses of Tewhey's friends.
17. Sometime on or about September of 1992, Nolan went to Rowe and
informed her of the former relationship that had existed between
Tewhey and Nolan.
18. On or about October 2, 1992, Smith informed Tewhey that Nolan had
seen him (Smith) in July and had described Tewhey as unstable. Smith
suggested that perhaps Tewhey should resign.
19. Tewhey refused to resign, stated that Nolan's actions amounted to
retaliation for Tewhey's refusal to continue a personal relationship
and as such, Nolan actions constituted sexual harassment. Tewhey asked
that Smith take action to insure that Nolan did not go to other
administrators and that Nolan be told that the harassment must end.
20. Smith acknowledged that nothing that had been raised with him was
work related, stated that Tewhey's tenure as Associate Dean had been
outstanding, apologized for raising these issues and stated that he
hoped Tewhey and Smith could continue their productive working
relationship.
21. On three separate occasions, over a period of a month, Tewhey
requested that Smith take some action to insure that Nolan was
informed of Tewhey's complaint and that appropriate action then be
taken by MIT.
22. On or about October 14, 1992, Tewhey asked a co-worker, to begin
to accompany Tewhey on any trips Tewhey took outside of Tewhey's
office. Tewhey made this request because of the increasing number of
times Nolan had been in or around the building where Tewhey's office
was located.
23. On or about October 28, 1992, Tewhey informed Smith that he,
Tewhey, intended to approach Nolan's supervisor with Tewhey's
complaint. Smith told Tewhey not to undertake such action as some at
MIT would construe it as sexual harassment.
24. During October 1992 and November 1992, Nolan met with Rowe on a
number of occasions now complaining that Tewhey was following her.
25. On or about November 12, 1992, Tewhey approached Rowe to raise
general concerns about Smith and Nolan. Without using names, Tewhey
outlined his concerns and asked for advice. Rowe suggested that
Tewhey was "burnt out" and should consider resigning. Rowe did not
notify Tewhey of Nolan's complaints.
26. On or about November 11, 1992, Tewhey met with Dr. Clarence
Williams, a special assistant to the president of MIT, to ask how to
deal with Nolan's harassment.
27. Sometime in December of 1992, Nolan and Rowe went to Smith,
alleging that Tewhey was following her and harassing her on the MIT
campus. Smith never told Tewhey about this complaint nor, to the best
of Tewhey's knowledge, did Smith undertake any action to ascertain the
validity of Nolan and Rowe's allegation.
28. On or about December 18, 1992, Nolan followed Tewhey and a
co-worker to Tewhey's parking lot and when the co-worker left Nolan
demanded Tewhey talk with her.
29. On or about January 20, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith and told him
that he intended to look for a position outside of MIT. Tewhey stated
that he was concerned about failure of Smith to place any boundaries
on Nolan's behavior and complained about on-going harassment.
30. On or about February 23, 1993, Glavin, Chief of MIT's Campus
Police, along with John Driscoll (''Driscoll"), Captain of the MIT
Campus Police, informed Tewhey that Nolan had lodged a complaint with
the MIT Campus Police alleging that Tewhey was following Nolan. Glavin
ordered Tewhey to stay away from Nolan.
31. Tewhey was informed that Nolan had been moved to a different
parking lot for her protection and that the location would remain
hidden from Tewhey.
32. Tewhey denied all allegations, pointed out that he had been away
from the campus for most of the last month and alleged that he was
being harassed. Tewhey requested that his parking lot be changed and
that his new location be kept secret from Nolan and this request was
refused as being unnecessary.
33. Tewhey, on or about February 23, 1993, again approached Rowe
regarding the allegations and was again told that Tewhey should
resign.
34. On or about February 24, 1993, Tewhey accompanied by his wife met
with Rowe and outlined his allegations of harassment. Rowe offered no
support to Tewhey and stated that Ms. Nolan's allegations sounded
credible.
35. On or about February 24, 1993, Tewhey accompanied by his wife met
with Glavin and Driscoll. Tewhey's wife described several incidents
where Nolan attempted to contact Tewhey and members of Tewhey's
family, but Tewhey's wife was told that this did not constitute
harassment.
36. Tewhey's wife was subjected to harassing and humiliating
allegations by Glavin.
37. Glavin told Tewhey that if he was on campus and saw Nolan he
should turn and go the other way or find a men's room to hide in.
38. Glavin told Tewhey that it would be easy for Nolan to get a
restraining order issued against Tewhey and that would create an
impossible situation for Tewhey.
39. Tewhey again asked that his parking lot be changed and the new
location be kept secret from Nolan and this request was again refused.
40. On or about February 26, 1993, Tewhey sent a written complaint to
Glavin regarding Nolan's behavior. To the best of Tewhey's knowledge,
no action was taken regarding that complaint.
41. On or about February 26, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith to inform him
of the interactions with Campus Police and Rowe.
42. On or about March 2, 1993 Tewhey met with Driscoll and again asked
that his parking lot be changed and Driscoll told Tewhey that such a
move was not necessary.
43. On or about March 3, 1993, Tewhey met with Rice and stated that he
wanted to file a grievance against Nolan. Rice suggested that instead
of a grievance, Tewhey write a letter to her outlining his concerns
and that this letter would constitute a form of protection for Tewhey.
44. On March 10, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey to inform Tewhey that
allegations had been made that his credentials were not in
order. Smith informed Tewhey that this allegation had been made by a
staff member and that Tewhey should assume that the information had
come from Nolan.
45. At the same meeting, Smith stated that there were a number of
individuals determined to get Tewhey fired and that Nolan was one of
them. Smith also informed Tewhey that he believed calls had been made
by Nolan and others to schools he had attended and places he had
worked in an attempt to find compromising information about Tewhey.
46. On or about March 24, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey and stated that
while there had been some irregularities regarding Tewhey's
credentials, Smith had determined that they were not serious enough to
warrant any disciplinary action.
47. On or about March 26, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith and told Smith
that he believed the situation at MIT was completely out of
control. Tewhey expressed concern that a number of people at MIT would
work with Nolan to get a restraining order issued against Tewhey,
expressed concern that an incident on campus would be manufactured to
embarrass Tewhey and Tewhey asked about the possibility of taking a
leave from MIT for a year.
48. On or about April 2, 1993, Nolan brought her allegations to
Hudson. Hudson called Tewhey, insisted upon a meeting and demanded
that Tewhey resign from his position at MIT.
49. On or about April 6, 1993, Tewhey met with Rice and an agreement
is reached on the terms of a paid leave of absence from MIT for
Tewhey.
50. On or about April 6, 1993, Nolan alleged to the Campus Police that
Tewhey had, at approximately 5:10 p.m., driven his car up next to her
and followed her through a red light during rush hour traffic onto
Massachusetts Avenue.
51. On or about April 7, 1993, with the assistance of Driscoll, Nolan
has issued in Cambridge Superior Court a temporary restraining order
(209A) against Tewhey.
52. On or about April 7, 1993, in a meeting attended by Hudson, Rowe,
Rice, Smith, Jay Keyser ("Keyser") Associate Provost at MIT, Glavin
and William Dickson, Senior Vice President at MIT, Rowe and Hudson
insist that Tewhey should be fired.
53. On or about April 7, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey and a co worker
and ordered Tewhey off-campus until this matter was resolved.
54. On or about April 9, 1993, Cambridge Superior Court vacated the
209A issued against Tewhey for Lack of Jurisdiction.
55. On or about April 9, 1993, Cambridge District Court at the request
of Tewhey, issued a temporary restraining order (209A) against Nolan.
56. On or about April 9, 1993, Newton District court, at the request
of Nolan, issued a temporary restraining order (209A) against Tewhey.
57. On or about April 13, 1993, Tewhey filed a written grievance with
the MIT Personnel office against Nolan alleging sexual harassment.
58. On Friday, April 16, 1993, Nolan testified at Newton District
Court that Hudson had told her that Tewhey blamed her for all of his
troubles and that, therefore, she feared retaliation. The judge
issued a restraining order based on the fear of retaliation .
59. On Tuesday, April 20, 1993, the 209A issued against Nolan is
vacated in that Tewhey is unable to show that his life is in danger.
60. On or about April 20, 1993, Wrighton, Provost at MIT, requested
Tewhey's resignation from his position as Associate Dean. Tewhey asked
that he be placed on leave as previously suggested and that MIT act on
his grievance against Nolan. Wrighton stated that Tewhey should resign
and that MIT would continue to pay Tewhey's salary until July
1994. Tewhey agreed to resign only if MIT would act on the
grievance. Wrighton was very reluctant, said that acting on the
grievance was not in MIT's interest, but finally agreed.
61. That night, Wrighton issued a statement to area newspapers stating
that Tewhey has problems he needs to resolved and had submitted his
resignation.
62. On or about May 2, 1993, Wrighton and Tewhey met again. Wrighton
strongly suggested that Tewhey withdraw his grievance against Nolan
and repeatedly Tewhey refused.
63. On or about May 19, 1993, Tewhey met with Rice, at that time the
Director of Personnel at MIT, and Rice informed Tewhey that a wide
ranging investigation of all allegations made against Tewhey would
take place. Rice informed Tewhey that he had been reassigned to the
Provost Office and would continue to receive salary and benefits from
MIT.
64. On or about May 19, 1993, during the same meeting, Rice informed
Tewhey that members of the Dean's Office had accused Tewhey of having
multiple affairs with undergraduate students of both sexes and that
these charge would also be investigated. Tewhey demanded that the
charges be investigated.
65. On or about May 19, 1993, at the aforementioned meeting, Rice told
Tewhey that Shea had made the above allegation.
66. On or about June 4, 1993, Rice wrote to Tewhey, stating that MIT
would not act on the grievance and that no wide ranging investigation
would take place.
67. On or about June 12, 1993, this decision was appealed to Wrighton
and the appeal was turned down.
68. On or about July 9, 1993, Wrighton's decision was appealed to
Vest, President of MIT.
69. On July 26, 1993, Tewhey filed a formal grievance with Wrighton
against Shea alleging that Shea had (1) approached Rice claiming that
Tewhey had engaged in multiple affairs with undergraduate women, (2)
alleged to Rice and other MIT administrators that Tewhey had sodomized
undergraduate males, (3) approached several MIT student newspapers and
attempted to induce them to print the above allegations and (4) had
sent electronic mail to former colleagues of Tewhey's at Smith College
asking for any compromising information that they might have in their
possession regarding his employment at Smith College. Tewhey included
copies of the electronic mail with the grievance.
70. On or about July 30, 1993, Tewhey received an annual raise in pay
from MIT.
71. On August 2, 1993, Vest informed Tewhey that MIT would not
investigate the grievance against Nolan.
72. On August 4, 1993, Wrighton deferred Tewhey's grievance against
Shea until Tewhey agreed to sign a letter of resignation.
73. On or about August 17, 1993, Tewhey filed an employment
discrimination charge with MCAD and EEOC outlining what he considered
to be discriminatory acts.
74. On or about October 12, 1993, a packet of material was sent to
Tewhey's academic advisor and the dean of the law school Tewhey was
attending. The packet was sent anonymously and contained the newspaper
articles (both local and national) detailing Tewhey's alleged
resignation from MIT in April of 1993.
75. On or about October 12, 1993, Tewhey received a letter from Rice
demanding that Tewhey sign a letter of resignation.
76. On or about October 14, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith and showed him
the package that had been sent to the law school and asked Smith to
intercede with MIT to assist Tewhey in protecting himself and his
family. Smith agreed to do so.
77. On or about October 17, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey at Smith's
home and told Tewhey he could expect no help from MIT regarding the
on-going harassment.
78. On or about October 18, 1993, Tewhey notified Wrighton that Tewhey
would not sign a letter of resignation.
79. On or about October 19, 1993, Tewhey was terminated from
employment at MIT.
80. As a result of the discriminatory acts as alleged herein, Tewhey,
has sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries.
81. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that defendants Shea and Nolan
unlawfully sexually harassed the plaintiff and created a hostile work
environment in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B
section 4, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 214 section 1C and other
related laws.
82. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendants MIT,
Smith, Rowe, Glavin, Wrighton, Hudson, Rice, and Vest acting as
agents, servants, and employees of MIT and acting without
justification or privilege, unlawfully sexually harassed the plaintiff
and created a hostile work environment in violation of General Laws
chapter 151B Section 4 and other related laws.
Wherefore, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendants,
MIT, Smith, Rowe, Glavin, Wrighton, Hudson, Rice, Shea, Nolan and vest
as follows:
A. That Tewhey be awarded compensatory damages.
B. That Tewhey be awarded punitive damages.
C. That Tewhey be awarded all reasonable attorney's fees, interest,
and costs of the suit.
D. For other such relief as to this court may seem just and proper.
Count II
(Violation of General Laws Chapter 12 Section llI)
83. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I of the
complaint.
84. The allegations contained in Count I of the Complaint also
constitute a violation of the General Laws Chapter 12 Section llI, in
that Tewhey's rights were violated through threats, intimidation, or
coercion within the meaning of General Laws chapter 12 Section 11I
85. As a result of the wrongful acts as alleged herein, Tewhey has
sustained severe and substantial damages as injuries.
86. This count is brought pursuant to General Laws Chapter 12 Section
11I
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendants MIT,
Smith, Rowe, Glavin, Wrighton, Hudson, Rice, Shea, Nolan and Vest as
follows:
A. That Tewhey be awarded compensatory damages.
B. That Tewhey be awarded punitive damages.
C. That Tewhey be awarded all reasonable attorney's fees, interest,
and costs of the suit.
D. For other such relief as to this court may seem just and proper.
COUNT III
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
87. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the complaint.
88. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Nolan knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Nolan's interference, Tewhey would
have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
89. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Nolan
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
90. The defendant Nolan created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
91. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
92. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Nolan
in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT IV
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
93. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the Complaint.
94. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Shea knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Shea's interference, Tewhey would have
continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
95. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Shea
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
96. The defendant Shea created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
97. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
98. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Shea
in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT V
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
99. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the Complaint.
100. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Smith knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Smith's interference, Tewhey would
have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
101. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Smith
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
102. The defendant Smith created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
103. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
104. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Smith
in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT VI
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
105. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the complaint.
106. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Wrighton knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with
the defendant MIT, and that but for Wrighton's interference, Tewhey
would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
107. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Wrighton
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
108. The defendant Wrighton created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
109. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
110. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant
Wrighton in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT VII
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
111. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the Complaint.
112. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Rowe knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Rowe's interference, Tewhey would have
continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
113. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Rowe
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
114. The defendant Rowe created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
115. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
116. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Rowe
in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT VIII
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
117. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the Complaint.
118. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Hudson knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Hudson's interference, Tewhey would
have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
119. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Hudson
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
120. The defendant Hudson created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
121. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
122. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant
Hudson in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT IX
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
123. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the Complaint.
124. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Rice knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Rice's interference, Tewhey would have
continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
125. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Rice
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
126. The defendant Rice created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
127. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
128. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Rice
in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT X
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
129. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the Complaint.
130. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Vest knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Vest's interference, Tewhey would have
continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
131. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Vest
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
132. The defendant vest created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
133. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
134. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Vest
in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT XI
(Intentional Interference with Advantageous
Contractual Relations)
135. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the complaint.
136. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the
defendant Glavin knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the
defendant MIT, and that but for Glavin's interference, Tewhey would
have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT.
137. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Glavin
intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with
Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT.
138. The defendant Glavin created a hostile and offensive work
environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an
employee of the defendant MIT.
139. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper
interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and
substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation,
injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage.
140. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant
Glavin in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT XII
(SLANDER)
141. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the Complaint.
142. Defendant Shea did maliciously make public false statements so as
to hold plaintiff up to hatred, ridicule and scorn and to discredit
him in the minds of considerable and respected class in the community.
WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Shea
in such amount as may be determined.
COUNT XIII
(ABUSE OF PROCESS)
143. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of
the complaint.
144. Defendant Nolan on April 9, 1993 maliciously and falsely, and
without probable cause, swore to an affidavit charging plaintiff with
harassment and thereafter used lawful process to accomplish an
unlawful purpose with malice and to Tewhey's damage.
145. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Nolan in
such amount as may be determined.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
SUDBURY, MA April 11, 1995
Then personally appeared the above named James R. Tewhey, and made
oath that he has read the allegations contained in this Complaint, and
that they are true to the best of his knowledge and belief, before me.
/s/ MANUELA DEROSA
__________________________
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 8/8/97
THE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES AND CLAIMS
TRIABLE BY JURY
By,
/s/ JAMES R. TEWHEY
___________________________
James R. Tewhey
Pro Se
120 Fairbank Road
Sudbury, MA 01776
(508) 443-5057
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX
THE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL DOCKET# MICV95-02130
RE: Tewhey v MIT et al
TO: James R Tewhey
120 Fairbank Road
Sudbury MA 01776
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TRACKING ORDER - A TRACK
You are hereby notified that this case is on the average (A) track as
per Superior Court Standing Order 1-88. The order requires that the
various stages of litigation described below must be completed not
later than the deadlines indicated.
STAGES OF LITIGATION DEADLINE
Service of process made and return filed with the Court 07/10/95
Response to the complaint filed (also see MRCP 12) 09/08/95
All motions under MRCP 12, 19, and 20 filed 09/08/95
All motions under MRCP 15 filed 07/04/96
All discovery requests and depositions completed 05/30/97
All motions under MRCP 56 filed and heard 07/29/97
Final pre-trial conference held and firm trial date set 11/26/97
Case disposed 04/10/98
The final pre-trial deadline is not the scheduled date of the
conference. You will be notified of that date at a later time.
Counsel for plaintiff must serve this tracking order on defendant
before the deadline for filing return of service.
This case is assigned to Superior Court session D sitting at
Middlesex.
Dated: 04/13/95
Edward J Sullivan, Clerk of Courts
BY:
J Haviland, Asst Clerk
Location: Rm 7A (Cambridge)
Telephone: 617-494-4251
The Archive Team